Chicago City Council and CB&Q Rail Compensation Analysis

Chicago City Council and CB&Q Rail Compensation Analysis

Question

Did Chicago’s disapproval and compensation awarded to the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad violate the due process clause of the 14th Amendment?

Does this law violate the powers conferred on Congress under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution?

Does prohibiting economic use of Lucas’ property equate to “receiving” equitable compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

If the city sells private property for urban development to help the struggling economy, does it violate the revenue provisions of the Fifth Amendment?

On October 9, 1880, the Chicago City Council voted to extend Rockwell Street to accommodate private property in addition to right-of-way on the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company site. As a result, the jury ruled fair compensation to the property owner. The railroad company earned $1 for claiming a right-of-way on the land. The company has filed an appeal.

The City of Chicago argued that due process was procedural in nature and consisted only of the hearing of cases. No, the court ruled in a 7-to-1 ruling that due process gives private property owners adequate compensation for ownership of their property. Following the procedures outlined in Illinois general statute, there was no violation of the company’s Fourteenth Amendment rights in Brown v. Johnson. Atwell was also present.

Justice Brewer dissented. He objected to the extent that the company would be rewarded fairly. The $1 reward was only nominal.

In this case, the acquisition clause of the Fifth Amendment was incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as determined in Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company v. City of Chicago, 166, United States, 241.

In this case, his two sections of Rockwell Street were connected by the City of Chicago using private property, including right-of-way from the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad Company. The case was filed in Cook County Circuit Court and the state was sentenced. A $1 compensation was paid to the railroad company, after which it appealed. The Supreme Court ruled that no 14th Amendment rights were violated.

Answer:

This case prompted the court to add a Fifth Amendment “due reparations” special clause to the Bill of Rights through the 14th Amendment’s due process clause. This case laid the groundwork for additional incorporation of other Bill of Rights provisions (Holloway & Noelting, 2018).

United States vs. Carolene Products Company, 304 US 144 (1938)

It concerns a law restricting interstate transportation of bottled milk. The defendants argued that the due process and trade clauses were unconstitutional. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted defendants’ motion, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued the district court’s judgment.

After Congress banned the interstate transportation of bottled milk, Carolen Products was indicted under his 1923 law, but was dismissed by a court of first instance. After appealing to the federal government under the Fifth Amendment, the court had to decide whether the act was illegal. The court upheld the law. A majority ruled that Congress could ban the shipment of dairy substitutes other than butter.

This case is famous for his fourth footnote, considered the most popular footnote in the Constitution. Judge Harlan Stone said the court could not overturn the ruling because it was based on supporting public health evidence, such as that found in Hebe v. Shaw.

Congress believed the legislation was essential to the welfare of the nation. Therefore, the harmful claim of bottled milk can be considered a disclosure of legal knowledge and an endorsement of the law.

The court applied the baseline reasonable test, and the legislative findings upheld the law as containing public health evidence. It also affects equal treatment clauses and judicial review.

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 103 (1992)

In 1986, Lucas purchased two of his residential properties on Barrier Island, South Carolina. State law prevented Lucas from building permanent structures on the land, which he enacted in 1988. Since the purpose was to protect the island from erosion and destruction, reparations must be paid according to Mugler v. Mugler. Kansas vs. Scranton vs. Wheeler. Lucas filed a lawsuit and subsequently received a large amount of compensation.

Lucas owned two vacant lots on an island off the coast of South Carolina. Due to the negative impact on public beaches, the Coastal Management Act prohibited the construction of permanent structures.

Procedure history

Yes, the court relied on a finding that Lucas’ ticket was voided in a 6-2 ruling under state law. John Stephens objected to this, saying the rule was unreasonable and a stupid addition to the taking.

The law prohibits owners from making any financial use of the land, including acquiring it until the interest is no longer part of the ownership in the first place. Therefore, the extent of damage to public lands should be assessed along with their social value and the ease with which the damage can be avoided through measures taken by the state or the applicant (Rossum & Tarr, 2018).

First, the judgment was overturned, with the majority arguing that restricting any economic use by the owner would be a disincentive to the property itself. It was decided that rules could be made under the National Harassment Act.

In this case, a gross returns test was established and parties were free to modify their claims to determine actual damages (Brown & Merriam, 2016).

Kello v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct 2655 (2005)

Susset Kerro and others filed a lawsuit in New London seeking confiscation of personal property, alleging that they had violated the Fifth Amendment’s ingestion clause. This ensured that the state would not confiscate private property without proper reimbursement.

Cash transfers are a permitted form of public use that give the state the right to withhold property from its citizens. No, according to a 5-4 ruling by John Paul Stevens, the sale of private property for public development was considered public use under the taking clause and the Fifth Amendment.

The proposed disposition of petitioner’s property qualifies as public use for acquisition clause purposes (Huffman, 2018).

Eight states in the United States have restricted the use of public property for economic development, and as of April 2019, 45 of them have enacted similar laws following the Kello incident.

In this case, land acquisition was used by the government to transfer one owner’s land to another for the purpose of economic development of the state, which was permitted by the Fifth Amendment acquisition clause (Brady, 2016).

In this case, the Beachfront Management Act was a legal action taken by state police to prohibit Mr. Lucas from building permanent structures to prevent erosion on the island, but the building ban allegedly prevented Mr. Lucas from using the land financially, thus affecting Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment revenues. According to Aggins v. Tiburon City, the state had to pay him fair compensation. Lucas’ earnings claim is not believed to be unconstitutional because the revised law requires him to obtain a special permit to build the property. As a result, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruling was overturned and declared that the Beachfront Management Act included “ingestion” (Pecorella, 2017).

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the public use reservation of the Acquisition Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution permits the use of “prominent territory” for the purpose of advances of money in the public interest. In this case, the Court ruled in Berman v. Parker that New London’s economic development served a public purpose under the Constitution’s public use proviso. However, the U.S. Constitution limits acquisition when the sole purpose is to transfer another person’s personal property in exchange for fair compensation.

References

Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 261

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)

Brady, M.E.( 2016) Property’s Ceiling: State Courts and the Expansion of Takings s Clause Property. Va. L. Rev., 102(2016), 1167. 

Brown v. Atwell, 92 U. S. 327

Brown, C. N., & Merriam, D. H. (2016). On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Lucas: Making or Breaking the Takings s Claim. Iowa L. Rev., 102(2016), 1847.

Cf. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 163

Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. S. 297. P. 304 U. S. 147

Holloway, J.E. & Noelting, D.T.( 2018) Takings s Clause and Integrated Sustainability Policy and Regulation: The Proportionality of the Burdens of Exercising Property Rights and Paying Just Compensation. Vill. Envtl. LJ, 29(2018), 1.

Huffman, J. L. (2018). Avoiding the Takings s clause Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work. Florida State University Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law, 3(2), 1.

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623

Pecorella, R. F. (2017). Property Rights, State Police Powers, and the Takings s Clause: The Evolution Toward Dysfunctional Land-Use Management. Fordham Urb. LJ, 44(2017), 59.

Rossum, R.A. & Tarr, A.( 2018) American Constitutional Law, Volume I: The Structure of Government. UK: Routledge,1-10.